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Products liability and comparative negligence are two very rapidly
developing fields of tort law. In recent years, the vast majority of courts
have adopted strict liability for harm caused by defective products. At
the same time, the doctrine of comparative negligence has changed al-
most overnight from a doctrine that had been accepted by only a hand-
ful of jurisdictions into What is now the majority approach in this coun-
try.1
Neither doctrine is as yet fully developed, especially with respect to
the way each is to interrelate with other rules of law. Further develop-
ments must be carefully considered because they will have a dramatic
effect on the impact of these two legal doctrines. This is especially true
in jurisdictions which adopt the current trend to apply comparative neg-
ligence to strict liability cases. The focus of this article is to deal with the
ways in which the two doctrines interrelate.
A. Policy Considerations
The philosophy underlying comparative negligence is that a plaintiff
who has been partially at fault in producing a harm to himself should
not recover his full damages from a defendant who also has been par-
tially at fault in .producing that harm. Rather, equity requires that the
plaintiff's recovery be diminished in proportion to the relation between
his own fault and the defendant's fault.2 It is frequently asserted that
this is what juries have commonly done anyway, in disregard of the
judge's instructions. 3
In addition to being more equitable than the all or nothing rule of
contributory negligence, 4 comparative negligence has the added virtue of
* Professor of Law, University of Missouri-Columbia; B.A. 1965, J.D. 1968,
University of Missouri-Columbia.
1. Brewster, Comparative Negligence in Strict Liability Cases, 42 J. AIR L. &
CoM. 107 (1976).
2. V. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE § 2.1 (1974).
3. V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 2, § 1.2(B) at n.57; Brewster, supra note 1, at
113; Levine, Buyer's Conduct as Affecting the Extent of Manufacturer's Liability in
Warranty, 52 MINN. L. REV. 627, 656-57 (1968); Noel, Defective Products: Abnormal
Use, Contributory Negligence, and Assumption of Risk, 25 VAND. L. REV. 93, 118
(1972); Prosser, Contributory Negligence as Defense to Violation of Statute, 32 MINN.
L. REV. 105, 127 (1948).
4. Brewster, supra note 1, at 113.
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promoting respect for the law. The approach permits the jury to decide
cases in accordance with the court's instructions rather than on subjective
emotion in disregard of a clear rule of law. 5
Products liability rules represent an attempt to resolve the tension
among several conflicting social policies. Imposition of liability permits
losses resulting to a few individuals to be spread among all consumers;
the manufacturer will have to raise the price of his product enough to
pay for the losses or to purchase insurance against those losses.' Poten-
tial liability also provides an incentive to produce safer products because
risk spreading increases costs, and competition forces the manufacturer
to keep his costs down.7 Balanced against these considerations is the
need to avoid imposition of liability so onerous that it will impair the
functioning of useful business enterprises. Imposition of liability on au-
tomobile manufacturers for all harm resulting from the use of their au-
tomobiles is consistent with the goals of risk-spreading and providing an
incentive to producing a safer product. However, because of the enor-
mity of harm caused by automobiles, such liability would have disastrous
consequences to the automobile industry. This would in turn have a
serious impact on the rest of our economy. Subsequent to the industrial
revolution, and until recently, the balance between these competing
policies has been drawn by requiring the injured party to establish fault
(negligence or intentional misconduct) before the loss would be shifted
to the manufacturer. The law of strict liability has eliminated the need to
prove fault, at least in many situations, but has substituted other limita-
tions which operate to prevent the manufacturer from being held liable
as an insurer.
At common law, contributory negligence was an absolute defense to
negligence actions. The justification for the defense is that it provides an
incentive to the plaintiff to use reasonable care for his own welfare,8 and
it provides an arbitrary protection for infant industry.' Simple con-
tributory negligence in failing to discover a risk is not a defense to a
strict products liability action because industry no longer needs this ar-
bitrary defense,10 and courts have come to dislike the all or nothing na-
ture of the defense.
There is an emerging trend, advocated by many legal writers, to
apply comparative negligence to strict liability actions.11 Several federal
5. V. SCHwARTZ, supra note 2, § 21.1 at 338; Levine, supra note 3, at 656-57.
6. Holford, The Limits of Strict Liability for Product Design and Manufacture, 52
TEX. L. REv. 81, 82-84, 87-88 (1973); Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability
for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825, 826 (1973).
7. See generally Holford, supra note 6; Wade, supra note 6.
8. V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 2, § 21.1 at 336; Fleming, The Supreme Court of
California, 1974-1975-Foreward: Comparative Negligence at Last-By Judicial
Choice, 64 CALF. L. REv. 239, 243 (1976).
9. Fleming, supra note 8, at 242; Levine, supra note 3, at 658.
10. SCHWARTZ, supra note 2, § 21.2 at 339-40.
11. Brewster, supra note 1, at 114; Feinberg, The Applicability of a Comparative
Negligence Defense in a Strict Products Liability Suit Based on Section 402A of the Re-
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courts, in diversity cases, have predicted that the state whose law was
being applied would adopt this approach. 12 Several state courts have
applied the comparative negligence concept to strict liability cases in one
form or another. 13 From a policy perspective, this is very desirable be-
cause the policies of risk-spreading and providing the plaintiff with an
incentive to act carefully can be simultaneously advanced14 in such a way
as to achieve a more equitable distribution of the loss. 1 5 This is because
the policy in favor of compensating the victim is impaired only to the
extent that he was at fault in not protecting himself.1 6 The entire loss is
spread among all consumers except for that portion of the loss that is
attributable to the victim's misconduct. It is difficult to justify shifting
this portion of loss to society as a whole.
B. Problems Arising from Application of
Comparative Negligence to Strict Liability
Application of comparative negligence to strict liability does present
one serious difficulty. This is the lack of a basis of comparison. In the
typical comparative negligence case the jury is asked to compare the
fault of the two negligent parties. This determination is wholly subjec-
statement of Torts 2D (Can Oil and Water Mix?), 42 INS. COUNSEL J. 39 (1975);
Fisher, Nugent & Lewis, Comparative Negligence: An Exercise in Applied Justice, 5
ST. MARY'S L.J. 655, 674 (1974); Fleming, supra note 8, at 270; Freedman, The
Comparative Negligence Doctrine Under Strict Liability: Defendant's Conduct Becomes
Another "Proximate Cause" of Injury, Damage or Loss, 1975 INS. L.J. 468; Levine,
supra note 3, at 637, 652; McNichols, The Kirkland v. General Motors Manufacturers'
Products Liability Doctrine-What's in a Name?, 27 OKLA. L. REv. 347, 407 (1974);
Noel, supra note 3, at 118; Phillips, The Standard for Determining Defectiveness in
Products Liability, 46 CIN. L. REV. 101, 108 (1977); Schwartz, Strict Liability and
Comparative Negligence, 42 TENN. L. REv. 171, 178 (1974); Vetri, Products Liability:
The Developing Framework for Analysis, 54 OR. L. REv. 293, 314 n.99 (1975); Wade,
Crawford & Ryder, Comparative Fault in Tennessee Tort Actions: Past, Present and
Future, 41 TENN. L. REv. 423, 452-53, 460 (1974).
12. Edwards v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 512 F.2d 276 (5th Cir. 1975); Rod-
rigues v. Ripley Indus., Inc., 507 F.2d 782 (1st Cir. 1974); Sun Valley Airlines,
Inc. v. Avco-Lycoming Corp., 411 F. Supp. 598 (D. Idaho 1976); Hagenbuch v.
Snap-On Tools Corp., 339 F. Supp. 676 (D.N.H. 1972); Chapman v. Brown, 198
F. Supp. 78 (D. Hawaii 1961). See also Pan Alaska Fisheries, Inc. v. Marine
Constr. & Design Co., 565 F.2d 1129 (9th Cir. 1977) (admiralty law).
13. Butaud v. Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods, Inc., 555 P.2d 42 (Alaska
1976); Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380, 575
P.2d 1162 (1978); West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 1976);
Busch v. Busch Constr., Inc., 262 N.W.2d 377 (Minn. 1977); General Motors
Corp. v. Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. 1977); Powers v. Hunt-Wesson Foods,
Inc., 64 Wis. 2d 532, 219 N.W.2d 393 (1974); Schuh v. Fox River Tractor Co.,
63 Wis. 2d 728, 218 N.W.2d 279 (1974); Netzel v. State Sand & Gravel Co., 51
Wis. 2d 1, 186N.W.2d 258 (1971); Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d
55 (1967).
15. Feinberg, supra note 11, at 44; Schwartz, supra note 11, at 179.
16. Noel, supra note 3, at 117.
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tive, but it is a rational determination.' 7 For example, it is clear that one
who intentionally runs a stoplight is more culpable than one who runs
the light because his attention is distracted. This is very similar to the
kind of subjective determination that the jury is required to make in
negligence cases. In such cases, the jury must decide not only what the
party did or failed to do, but it also must evaluate that conduct and
determine whether it was reasonable or unreasonable."' In a compara-
tive negligence case, the jury goes further and determines how un-
reasonable it is.19 The difficulty is that in many strict liability cases the
defendant is not at fault. In such cases there is no negligence to compare
with plaintiff's negligence.
In cases where the defendant is not negligent, a plaintiff who is
even slightly contributorily negligent will be completely barred from re-
covery.20 This is because under comparative negligence the jury is re-
quired to take the combined negligence of both parties as being 100
percent and attribute an appropriate percentage to each party. If the
defendant's fault is zero, it follows that the plaintiff's fault will automati-
cally be 100 percent, no matter how slight that fault is. The result is that
simple contributory negligence becomes an absolute defense to strict lia-
bility actions in such cases.
Furthermore, this result is one that is likely to happen with some
frequency because the vast majority of comparative negligence jurisdic-
tions have adopted some form of modified comparative negligence. 21
Under this system, contributory negligence is an absolute bar if the
plaintiff has been either equally negligent or more negligent than the
defendant, depending on the form of modified comparative negligence.
Because the defendant's liability is based upon principles of risk dis-
tribution rather than personal culpability, there are likely to be a great
many cases where the jury would find that the defendant is less at fault
than the plaintiff.2 2 Thus, simple contributory negligence in the failure
to discover the danger will often become a complete defense in many
products liability cases.
Application of the doctrine in this manner is unacceptable. The vast
majority of courts have determined that simple contributory negligence
17. Aiken, Proportioning Comparative Negligence-Problems of Theory and Special
Verdict Formulation, 53 MARQ. L. REv. 293, 294-95 (1970).
18. Morris, The Relation of Criminal Statutes to Tort Liability, 46 HARV. L. REv.
453, 454 (1933).
19. See text accompanying notes 41-48 infra for a listing of the factors
considered in making the comparative negligence determination. They are es-
sentially the same as the factors used in determining whether a party is negligent
in the first place.
20. Payne, Reduction of Damages for Contributoy Negligence, 18 MOD. L. REv.
344, 344-45 (1955).
21. See Part II infra.
22. V. SCHwARTZ, supra note 2, §§ 12.6, 12.7. See Part II infra.
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in failing to discover a risk should not be an absolute defense in strict
liability actions.
An alternative to finding for the defendant in such cases is for the
jury to ignore the court's instructions and to award damages to the
plaintiff according to its own subjective sense of justice.
Ironically the two major justifications for comparative negligence
(harshness of the all or nothing rule of contributory negligence and un-
desirability of permitting jury to disregard a rule of law) both arise as
arguments against comparative negligence in strict liability cases if dam-
ages are to be apportioned on the basis of comparative culpability. Cer-
tainly the all or nothing rule of contributory negligence is more objec-
tionable in strict liability cases than in negligence cases because as a
matter of policy most courts have determined that it should not be an
absolute defense in strict liability cases. Common law courts did not
reach this decision in negligence cases. Furthermore, if "a system which
succeeds only by utter disregard of its basic rules is clearly unsatisfac-
tory" 23 in negligence cases, then it should be equally unsatisfactory in
strict liability cases.
The reaction of scholars and courts to these problems has been
mixed. Some have rejected the application of comparative negligence to
strict liability because of the problem of no appropriate basis of compari-
son, 24 because the comparative negligence statute involved did not apply
to strict liability cases,25 or because contributory negligence is not a de-
fense to strict liability.26 Others have accepted the applicability of com-
parative negligence to strict liability. 27 They have attempted to overcome
the problem of a lack of an appropriate basis of comparison in one of
two ways. The first is to redefine the term "fault" so as to include the
defendant's innocent conduct, and then have the jury compare the de-
fendant's fictitious "fault" with the plaintiff's actual fault. The second
method is to have the jury compare causation rather than fault. Both of
these approaches are discussed in depth in Part III infra. For reasons
discussed there, it will be seen that these approaches are an unsatisfac-
23. Levine, supra note 3, at 657.
24. Buccery v. General Motors Corp., 60 Cal. App. 3d 533, 132 Cal. Rptr.
605 (1976); Kinard v. Coats Co., 553 P.2d 835 (Colo. App. 1976); Kalven, Com-
ments on Maki v. Frelk-Comparative v. Contributory Negligence: Should the Court or
Legislature Decide?, 21 VAND. L. REv. 897, 904 (1968); Levine, Strict Products Lia-
bility and Comparative Negligence: The Collision of Fault and No-Fault, 14 SAN DIEGO
L. REv. 337, 356 (1977); Note, Products Liability, Comparative Negligence, and the
Allocation of Damages Among Multiple Defendants, 50 S. CALIF. L. REv. 73, 102
(1976).
25. Brown v. Link Belt Corp., 565 F.2d 1107 (9th Cir. 1977); Melia v. Ford
Motor Co., 534 F.2d 795 (8th Cir. 1976); Kirkland v. General Motors Corp., 521
P.2d 1353 (Okla. 1974).
26. Kirkland v. General Motors Corp., 521 P.2d 1353 (Okla. 1974).
27. See Part III infra.
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tory solution to the problem. There is a satisfactory way to apply com-
parative negligence to strict liability cases. This method is discussed in
Part IV infra.
Once the decision to apply comparative negligence to strict liability
is made, a further problem arises. The extent to which comparative neg-
ligence is to be applied to assumption of the risk and misuse must be
determined. These questions will be discussed in the next issue of the
Missouri Law Review.
II. COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE
A. Method of Reducing Damages
Comparative negligence works in the following way. The degree of
the plaintiff's culpability (negligence) is compared to the degree of the
defendant's culpability (negligence). The combined culpability (negli-
gence) of the two parties is deemed to equal 100 percent, and the
amount of the plaintiff's recovery is reduced in proportion to the
amount of negligence attributable to him.28 Thus, if the plaintiff's dam-
ages are $10,000 and he is 30 percent at fault while the defendant is 70
percent at fault, he will be able to recover 70 percent of his damages or
$7,000. Likewise, if the plaintiff is 40 percent at fault and the defendant
is 60 percent at fault, the plaintiff will be able to recover 60 percent of
his damages or $6,000.
B. Pure Comparative Negligence
Under a system of pure comparative negligence, the plaintiff can
recover even though his fault is greater than that of the defendant. 20
Thus a plaintiff who is 90 percent at fault may recover 10 percent of his
damages. If he is 99 percent at fault, he may recover 1 percent of his
damages. Six states have adopted pure comparative negligence, three by
statute 30 and three by judicial decision. 31
C. Modified Comparative Negligence
Modified comparative negligence is a system that permits the plain-
tiff's fault to diminish his recovery rather than constitute an absolute
defense only if that fault does not exceed a specified percentage of neg-
ligence. 32 Once this level is exceeded, contributory negligence reenters as
an absolute defense.
28. V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 2, § 3.2.
29. Id.
30. Id. § 1.4.
31. Kaatz v. State, 540 P.2d 1037 (Alaska 1975); Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13
Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975); Hoffman v. Jones, 280
So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973).
32. V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 2, § 3.5(A).
[Vol. 43
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Twelve states have adopted a form of modified comparative negli-
gence which permits the plaintiff a proportionally reduced recovery as
long as his negligence was less than the defendant's negligence. 3 This is
sometimes referred to as the 49 percent system, because at the point of
his being 49 percent negligent, the plaintiff may recover 51 percent of
his damages. However, if his negligence is equal to or greater than the
defendant's, he may recover nothing. Because of the difficulty of pre-
cisely determining the exact percentages of fault, juries frequently
return verdicts finding the parties equally at fault.3 4 This tendency pro-
duces a hardship under the 49 percent system because under such cir-
cumstances the plaintiff is completely barred.
In order to avoid this hardship, seven states have enacted the 50
percent type of modified comparative negligence. 35 Under this system,
the plaintiff can recover a proportionally reduced amount of damages if
his negligence is equal to or less than the defendant's negligence. 8 If the
jury finds the parties to be equally at fault, the plaintiff recovers one-
half of his damages.
The "slight/gross" system of modified comparative negligence has
been adopted in two states.3 7 This system does not employ fixed per-
centage limits. The plaintiff's award is proportionally reduced only if his
negligence is slight and the defendant's negligence is gross in compari-
son.38 Otherwise, contributory negligence remains a complete bar.
D. Multiple Defendants
The existence of multiple defendants creates problems of adminis-
tration under modified comparative negligence. If the plaintiff is 40
percent at fault and each of three defendants is 20 percent at fault,
there is a question whether the plaintiff is barred because his negligence
is greater than the negligence of any given defendant. In some jurisdic-
tions he is not barred as long as he is eligible to recover under the stat-
ute if his negligence is compared to the combined negligence of the
multiple defendants. In other jurisdictions, the plaintiff would recover
nothing in this situation because his negligence is compared to the negli-
gence of each individual defendant to determine whether he could re-
cover from that particular defendant. In such jurisdictions, if the plain-
tiff's negligence is 40 percent, defendant A's negligence is 50 percent,
and defendant B's negligence is 10 percent, the plaintiff can recover
from defendant A but not from defendant B.
33. Feinberg, supra note 11, at 44.
34. V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 2, § 3.5(B).
35. Id.
36. Id.




Fischer: Fischer:  Products Liability--Applicability of Comparative Negligence
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1978
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
E. Basis of Comparison
Comparative negligence does not change the common law doctrine
that negligence is not actionable unless it is a cause of the harm. There-
fore, only the negligence of the parties which caused the harm may be
considered under comparative negligence.39
Once causation is established, the comparison is between the culpa-
bility of the plaintiff and that of the defendant rather than the causal
contribution made by the plaintiff and the defendant. 40 The following
factors are considered in comparing the fault of the parties:
1. The magnitude of the harm threatened by the conduct;
41
the more dangerous the conduct, the more culpable the
party is likely to be.42
2. The extent to which the harm was foreseeable.4 3 In this re-
gard inadvertent conduct is less culpable than the deliberate
creation of a risk of harm.44 The diminished capacity of the
party45 or the presence of an emergency 46 are also factors
which lessen culpability.
3. Balanced against the foregoing factors is the value of the
interest the party was protecting by his conduct. 47 Less cul-
pability is involved in taking an unreasonable risk to achieve
a worthy objective than to achieve an unworthy one. How-
ever, this factor must be considered in light of the alterna-
tive means available to the party to protect his interests. 48
In addition to-considering the relative fault of the parties, a few
jurisdictions also purport to compare the causal contribution of the fault
in producing the harm. 49 This is normally done in a very loose fashion50
without any attempt to define how much weight is to be given each fac-
tor or in what manner causal potency or directness is to be deter-
mined.51 Causal contribution is an unsatisfactory basis of comparison for
several reasons. This is discussed in depth in Part III infra.
39. Id. § 4.1.
40. Id. § 17.1; Fleming, supra note 8, at 249; Prosser, Comparative Negligence,
51 MICH. L. REV. 465, 481 (1953); Note, supra note 24, at 79.
41. V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 2, § 17.1.
42. Wade, Crawford & Ryder, supra note 11, at 451.
43. V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 2, § 17.1.
44. Wing v. Morse, 300 A.2d 491, 500 (Me. 1973); Wade, Crawford & Ryder,
supra note 11, at 451.
45. Wade, Crawford & Ryder, supra note 11, at 451.
46. Wing v. Morse, 300 A.2d 491, 500 (Me. 1973); Wade, Crawford & Ryder,
supra note 11, at 451.
47. V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 2, § 17.1.
48. Id.
49. Wing v. Morse, 300 A.2d 491 (Me. 1973); Kohler v. Dumke, 13 Wis. 2d
211, 108 N.W.2d 581 (1961).
50. Prosser, supra note 40, at 481.
51. Kohler v. Dumke, 13 Wis. 2d 211, 108 N.W.2d 581 (1961).
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III. CASES APPLYING COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE
To STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY
A. Negligence Per Se Theory
In Dippel v. Sciano 52 Wisconsin became the first jurisdiction to apply
its comparative negligence statute to strict liability cases. The court
adopted section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.53 In dictum it
indicated that contributory negligence is a defense and that the Wiscon-
sin modified comparative negligence statute applies.5 4
The court reached this result by reasoning that the strict liability
imposed by the Restatement is analogous to negligence per se. If the sec-
tion had been enacted by statute, the court would have considered a
violation to be negligence per se and would have applied modified com-
parative negligence. The court reasoned that because it could have done
this by adopting a statutory standard of care (had there been one), it
could achieve the same result by announcing a standard of care as a
matter of law.
The court countered the argument that liability under the Restate-
ment is not negligence because foreseeability is not required by pointing
out that under negligence per se the defendant is also foreclosed on the
question of foreseeability. Some legal writers have agreed with this anal-
ogy,55 sometimes arguing that this form of strict liability is indistinguish-
able from cases which apply the negligence per se theory to violations of
"pure food" statutes and at the same time refuse to recognize any ex-
cuse for violation.
5 6
A comparison of common law negligence with negligence per se il-
lustrates that the negligence per se analogy to section 402A is inappro-
priate. The function of the jury in a common law negligence case is
twofold. It must decide the facts and it also must decide the ethical
question of whether the defendant acted reasonably.57 The latter func-
tion requires the jury to establish a specific standard of conduct, i.e.,
what specific precaution a reasonable person would have taken in order
to protect the plaintiff.58 The only guidance the law provides in such
cases is to establish the general standard of conduct, 59 i.e., a reasonable
52. 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967).
53. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) [hereinafter cited
as RESTATEMENT].
54. 37 Wis. 2d 443, 461, 155 N.W.2d 55, 63 (1967).
55. Feinberg, supra note 11, at 41-42; Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufac-
turers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5, 14 (1965); Wade, supra note 6, at 850.
56. Wade, supra note 55, at 14; Wade, supra note 6, at 835.
57. Morris, supra note 18, at 454.
58. RESTATEMENT, supra note 53, § 285, comment g.
59. Id. comment d; Morris, supra note 18, at 454.
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man standard. Under this guidance, the jury determines the specific
standard of conduct required,6 0 e.g., in a collision case, that the defend-
ant should have signaled his intention to turn.
In negligence per se cases the court determines that a legislatively
established specific standard of conduct shall constitute the standard of
conduct of a reasonable person.6' For example, a statute might require a
driver to signal his intention to turn 200 feet prior to turning. The role
of the jury is merely to determine the facts, i.e., whether the statute was
violated. 2 The jury is not permitted to determine that some precaution
other than the one provided in the statute was reasonable. Negligence
per se is a determination that the only reasonable precaution is the one
provided in the statute.
Because negligence per se addresses itself to the specific standard of
conduct rather than a general standard of conduct, the only type of
statute that is appropriate is a safety statute that prescribes a particular
precaution 63 for the protection of the plaintiff from the type of harm
that he suffered. 64
Negligence per se is not strict liability. It is true that the jury is not
permitted to determine that some precaution other than the one pre-
scribed in the statute is reasonable because that issue has been deter-
mined as a matter of law. This does not mean that a defendant who fails
to comply with the statute has used reasonable care. He is normally at
fault for not taking the required precaution. However, if he has an
adequate reason for not taking the required precaution, e.g., existence of
an emergency or reasonable ignorance of occasion for compliance,6" he
is not at fault.66 The violation is excused, and he is not negligent. 67 A
defendant who unreasonably fails to comply with a statute is at fault, but
liability based on such fault is not strict liability.
Statutes which are interpreted as not recognizing excuse actually
impose strict liability; 68 the defendant is held liable even though he
could not have reasonably complied with the statute. Courts have nor-
mally used negligence per se terminology in imposing liability for viola-
tion of "pure food" statutes; however, because no excuses are recognized
60. RESTATEMENT, supra note 53, § 285, comment d; Morris, supra note 18, at
454.
61. RESTATEMENT, supra note 53, § 285, comment i.
62. Morris, supra note 18, at 455.
63. Gregory, Breach of Criminal Licensing Statutes in Civil Litigation, 36 COR-
NELL L.Q. 622, 625 (1951).
64. RESTATEMENT, supra note 53, § 286.
65. Id. § 288A.
66. Morris, supra note 18, at 458.
67. RESTATEMENT, supra note 53, § 288A.
68. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF TORTS 197 (4th ed. 1971); RE-
STATEMENT, supra note 53, § 288A, comment c.
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for violating such statutes,69 it is generally recognized that strict liability
is being imposed.70
If section 402A of the Restatement were enacted into law as a crimi-
nal statute it would be analogous to the pure food statutes. A court
could impose civil liability based on its violation and denominate the ac-
tion negligence per se. However, this would constitute strict liability
rather than liability based on fault. Wisconsin would recognize no excuse
for failing to comply with the statute no matter how reasonable the
defendant was in failing to comply.71 Thus, the defendant could be held
strictly liable for violating this statute even though he was completely
faultless in being unable to comply, a result that is not possible in true
negligence per se situations.
Furthermore, the Restatement is inappropriate for negligence per se
because it does not create a specific standard of conduct. In true negli-
gence per se cases the defendant's fault in failing to comply with the
statute is available for comparison with the plaintiff's fault in contribut-
ing to his own injury. This comparison is possible because negligence per
se addresses itself to the specific standard of conduct. The jury compares
the unreasonable failure of the defendant to take the precaution im-
posed by statute with the unreasonable failure of the plaintiff to take the
precaution that the jury has determined he should have taken. Such a
comparison is not possible under section 402A. This section does not
really address itself to a specific standard of conduct, i.e., specific
-methods manufacturers must use in order to achieve the objective of
producing products free from defects. It merely condemns the end re-
sult of marketing a defective product. Because no finding of negligence
is necessary, the jury could conclude that no reasonable precaution on
behalf of the manufacturer would have prevented the creation of the
defect. In this situation a comparison of the defendant's reasonable con-
duct with the specific personal culpability of the plaintiff would yield the
conclusion that the plaintiff was at fault and the defendant was not. In
such a case plaintiff's contributory negligence emerges as a complete de-
fense.72
The negligence per se rationale is clearly a fiction.73 Even the Wis-
consin court has recognized this.74 Although legal fictions are sometimes
69. Authorities cited note 68 supra.
70. R. DICKERSON, PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND THE FOOD CONSUMER, § 1.24
(1951); W. PROSSER, supra note 68, § 36, at 197-98; RESTATEMENT, supra note 53,
§ 288A, comment c; Wade, supra note 55, at 9; Wade, supra note 6, at 835.
71. Howes v. Deere & Co., 71 Wis. 2d 268, 238 N.W.2d 76 (1976) (adopting
Judge Heffernan's opinion as representing view of majority of court); Greiten v.
La Dow, 70 Wis. 2d 589, 599-604, 235 N.W.2d 677, 683-86 (1975) (Heffernan,
J., concurring).
72. Schuh v. Fox River Tractor Co., 63 Wis. 2d 728, 218 N.W.2d 279 (1974).
73. V. SCHwARTZ, supra note 2, § 12.1; Fleming, supra note 8, at 270.
74. Howes v. Deere & Co., 71 Wis. 2d 268, 238 N.W.2d 76 (1976) (adopting
Judge Heffernan's opinion as representing view of majority of court); Greiten v.
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useful, this one is unnecessary and leads to highly undesirable conse-
quences in certain cases.
B. Fictitious Fault
In our system of law fault means personal culpability, including
negligence,75 recklessness, and intentional misconduct. Conversely, strict
liability means "liability without fault." 76
Because of the desirability of applying comparative negligence to
strict liability, a number of judges 77 and writers 7 8 have urged that strict
liability does involve "fault" that can be compared with the plaintiff's
contributory negligence.7 This is either the "social fault"' 0 involved in
marketing defective products or the "legal fault" 1 arising from a breach
of duty to market defect-free products.
This approach does not solve the underlying problem of the lack of
a workable basis of comparison. The word "fault" can be redefined to in-
clude innocent conduct as well as culpable conduct, but this merely begs
the question. "S6cial fault" in marketing defective products still has
nothing in common with the type of specific personal culpability re-
quired for contributory negligence. The concepts cannot be compared
rationally.82
To illustrate, suppose the plaintiff purchases an axe with a physical
imperfection in the handle. A reasonable person in his position would
have discovered the defect and realized that this involved a serious
danger, but plaintiff failed to observe the defect. In using the axe, the
handle breaks and the head of the axe forcefully falls on the plaintiff's
leg, seriously injuring him. The plaintiff brings suit against the
wholesaler who purchased and resold the axe to a retailer without ever
opening the carton.
La Dow, 70 Wis. 2d 589, 599-604, 235 N.W.2d 677, 683-86 (1975) (Heffernan,
J., concurring).
75. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 738 (Rev. 4th ed. 1968); Polelle, The Foreseea-
bility Concept and Strict Products Liability: The Odd Couple of Tort Law, 8 RUT.-CAM.
L.J. 101, 102 (1976).
76. BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 1591 (Rev. 4th ed. 1968).
77. Sun Valley Airlines, Inc. v. Avco-Lycoming Corp., 411 F. Supp. 598 (D.
Idaho 1976); Horn v. General Motors Corp., 17 Cal. 3d 359, 372, 551 P.2d 398,
405, 131 Cal. Rptr. 78, 85 (1976) (Clark, J., dissenting).
78. Brewster, supra note 1, at 118; Fleming, supra note 8, at 270.
79. Butaud v. Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods, Inc., 555 P.2d 42 (Alaska
1976) (one judge urged adoption of comparative causation rather than compara-
tive fault); Horn v. General Motors Corp., 17 Cal. 3d 359, 372, 551 P.2d 398,
405, 131 Cal. Rptr. 78, 85 (1976) (Clark, J., dissenting); Brewster, supra note 1,
at 118; Fleming, supra note 8, at 270.
80. Fleming, supra note 8, at 270.
81. Sun Valley Airlines, Inc. v. Avco-Lycoming Corp., 411 F. Supp. 598 (D.
Idaho 1976).
82. Payne, supra note 20, at 347.
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The plaintiff's departure from the standard of reasonable conduct,
however great or small it may be in this case, cannot be compared with
the "social fault" of the wholesaler in marketing the defective axe. The
reason for this becomes apparent when the nature of comparative negli-
gence is examined. The process of comparison involved is to make a
subjective judgment that the plaintiff's blameworthy conduct is either
"more or less blameworthy than other blameworthy conduct (actual or
hypothetical)." 8 3 Blameworthy conduct may be placed on a spectrum
with simple inadvertance at the lower end of the spectrum and inten-
tional infliction of harm at the opposite end; recklessness is somewhere
between the two, and conscious disregard of a risk falls between inad-
vertence and recklessness.8 4 In comparing the culpable conduct of two
individuals, it is rational to determine where the conduct of each. lies
upon that spectrum and to determine that one was more culpable than
the other. Thus, an intentional wrongdoer is more culpable than a neg-
ligent wrongdoer. Even if both wrongdoers are guilty of mere inadver-
tence, there can be a difference in culpability depending on the mag-
nitude of the foreseeable risk, the utility of the plaintiff's conduct, etc.
In the example, the plaintiff's culpability would be evaluated by consid-
ering the extent to which the harm was forseeable, the magnitude of the
harm threatened by use of a defective axe, the interest the plaintiff was
protecting in not bothering to inspect the handle, etc. The reason that
the plaintiff's inadvertence in the example cannot be compared with the
social fault of the wholesaler is because his social fault does not lie any-
where on the spectrum of blameworthiness. The result of the compari-
son must be that the wholesaler's blameworthiness is zero. This attributes
100 percent of the fault to the plaintiff, regardless of how slight his
negligence might be. He is completely barred from recovery.
It might be argued that social fault is just as relative as personal
culpability. For example, because the underlying basis of strict liability is
risk spreading, the manufacture may be in a better position to spread
the risk than the wholesaler and thus guilty of more social fault. In ad-
dition, to the extent that deterrence underlies the imposition of strict
liability, the manufacturer is guilty of more social fault than the retailer
because deterrence applies only to him, the wholesaler having no control
over the manufacturing process. However, even if there are relative de-
grees of social fault just as there are relative degrees of personal fault,
the two still can not be compared because they lie on different scales.
Telling the jury to compare personal culpability with social fault is like
telling them to compare distance with temperature. The concepts are not
comparable and no change in terminology can make them comparable.
Those advocating that comparative negligence be applied to strict
liability cases often dismiss the absence of a basis for comparison as
83. Aiken, supra note 17, at 295 (emphasis in original).
84. Wing v. Morse, 300 A.2d 491, 500 (Me. 1973).
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being a mere theoretical difficulty which will not keep the jury, as a
practical matter, from reaching a just apportionment."5 It is true that the
jury can solve the apportionment problem without any practical diffi-
culty whatsoever. There are dozens of methods of apportionment that
human beings might employ.
A serious practical problem arising from implementation of this
philosophy is that the court has no way of controlling which method of
apportionment the jury is using in a given case. This problem will arise
whenever the case is submitted to the jury with no guidelines at all, with
guidelines that are so vague that they have no meaning, or with
guidelines that cannot be logically applied. A judgment for the defend-
ant might be based either on the plaintiff's fault or on the jury's dislike
of strict liability. A judgment for the plaintiff could be based on a dislike
of the defendant corporation or on the absence of contributory fault by
the plaintiff.
Whether to impose liability on the defendant, and the extent of that
liability, are important questions of social policy. The way in which com-
parative negligence is applied involves that question, i.e., to what extent
risk spreading should be sacrificed in order to deter the plaintiff and
others like him. This is a question that should be rationally resolved and
consistently applied in all cases. It is a highly improper to let the jury
decide such policy questions on a completely ad hoc basis with no
meaningful guidance from the court. Under such circumstances the tort
system becomes a "thinly disguised lottery."8 6 Such an apparatus is
clearly an inadequate means of making the type of policy decisions in-
volved.
C. Comparative Causation
Apparently recognizing the impossibility of comparing "social fault"
with personal fault, a number of legal writers have advocated compari-
son of the causal contribution of the parties to the result.8 7 At least two
courts have purported to do this.8 8 A concurring judge in another
85. Butaud v. Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods, Inc., 555 P.2d 42 (Alaska
1976); Horn v. General Motors Corp., 17 Cal. 3d 359, 372, 551 P.2d 398, 405,
131 Cal. Rptr. 78, 85 (1976) (Clark, J., dissenting); McNichols, supra note 11, at
401; Noel, supra note 3, at 118; Schwartz, supra note 11, at 181; Twerski, The Use
and Abuse of Comparative Negligence in Products Liability, 10 IND. L. REv. 797, 806
(1977).
86. Henderson, Expanding the Negligence Concept: Retreat from the Rule of Law,
51 IND. L.J. 467, 468 (1976).
87. Brewster, supra note 1, at 118; Jensvold, A Modern Approach to Loss Alloca-
tion Among Tortfeasors in Products Liability Cases, 58 MINN. L. REv. 723, 725 (1974);
Comment, Tort Defenses to Strict Products Liability, 20 SYRACUSE L. REv. 924, 945
(1969); Note, Torts-Doctrine of Strict Liability Meets a Comparative Negligence Stat-
ute, 17 DEPAUL L. REv. 614, 618 (1968).
88. Sun Valley Airlines, Inc. v. Avco-Lycoming Corp., 411 F. Supp. 598 (D.
Idaho 1976); General Motors Corp. v. Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. 1977).
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opinion advocated that it be done rather than attempt to compare the
fault of parties.8 9
This presents two problems. First, in most situations it is no easier to
compare the causal contribution of the parties than it is to compare neg-
ligence with strict liability. Second, there is no functional relationship
between fault and causal contribution. In terms of achieving the objec-
tives underlying strict liability and comparative negligence, the result is
no better than a purely random method of apportionment.
It is virtually impossible to measure the causal potency or contribu-
tion of a given cause. 90 The concurrence of many causes is required to
produce any given event,9 ' and each cause is equally necessary to pro-
duce the result in the sense that without the cause the event would not
have occurred. 92
Furthermore, even assuming that the contribution of each cause can
be measured, its significance would be considerably distorted under a
system of comparative negligence. The contribution of a given cause is
meaningful only if it is measured in relation to all other causes. 93 How-
ever, a system of comparative causation would attempt to measure only
the relative contribution of the parties without regard to all the other
causes. 94 The resulting ratio is not an accurate statement of the amount
that each party contributed to the result, but is at most a comparison of
two causes in isolation. 95
In other areas of the law, courts have seldom been successful in
evaluating causal contribution. For example, when joint tortfeasors act
independently to produce an indivisible harm, courts are willing to ap-
portion damages if there is a reasonable basis for determining the con-
tribution of each cause to the harm.96 The courts have found few such
bases. Water pollution can be apportioned according to how much pol-
lutant each defendant added to the system, 97 and livestock killed by a
pack of dogs can be apportioned according to how many dogs each of
the defendants owned.9 8 These analogies are of little use in most prod-
ucts liability cases.
As products liability cases normally involve accidents, one possible
basis of apportioning causal contribution is to measure the physical force
that each party contributed to the accident. Professor Schwartz illus-
89. Butaud v. Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods, Inc., 555 P.2d 42, 47
(Alaska 1976) (Rabinowitz, J., concurring).
90. Aiken, supra note 17, at 296; Payne, supra note 20, at 353.





96. RESTATEMENT, supra note 53, § 433A.
97. Id. comment d.
98. Id. comment d.
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trated this approach with an example 99 similar to the following: an intox-
icated motorcyclist traveling 65 miles an hour crosses the center line of
the highway and runs into a truck going 65 miles per hour. Considering
the weight, speed, and direction of each vehicle, it is scientifically deter-
mined that the truck contributed 95 percent of the force involved. If
damages are apportioned on this basis, the motorcyclist's estate would
receive 95 percent of his damages. This result is inconsistent with the
objectives of comparative negligence. The motorcyclist was clearly more
culpable than the truck driver, and if losses are to be distributed in ac-
cordance with fault, the result is wrong.100
The reason comparative causation yields such an unsatisfactory re-
sult is because there is no functional relationship between physical cau-
sation and personal culpability. The result yielded by applying compara-
tive causation is random. This is illustrated by reversing the facts in the
example. If it had been the truck driver who was intoxicated and driving
on the wrong side of the road, and assuming the evidence as to physical
force is the same, the truck driver would receive 5 percent of his dam-
ages from the motorcyclist. If both individuals had been driving au-
tomobiles of equal size and weight the drunkard would receive 50 per-
cent of his damages from the slightly negligent driver of the other car.
In all three examples the fault of the drunken driver is the same. Yet
whether he recovers 95 percent of his damages, 50 percent of his dam-
ages, or 5 percent of his damages, depends on the entirely fortuitous
circumstance of the weight of his motor vehicle. It is obvious that a lot-
tery which allocated damages on a purely random basis would be as
satisfactory as physical causation.
Apportioning damages according to the amount of physical force
attributable to each party would be especially unsatisfactory in cases
where all the force is attributable to one party. For example, in many
exploding soda bottle cases all the force would be attributable to the
defendant. In cases where a splinter from a defective hammer injures
the plaintiff's eye, all the physical force involved would be attributable to
the plaintiff if he was using the hammer. The entire loss would be borne
by the defendant in the former case and by the plaintiff in the latter
case without regard to the relative degree of fault involved.
Causation has no relationship to the policy bases underlying the
need to apportion damages. Therefore, any other basis for attributing
causal contribution, such as directness versus indirectness, will have the
same shortcomings as the use of physical force as the basis of appor-
tionment. The policy of risk distribution is to spread the loss among all
consumers rather than to let it lie with the plaintiff. However, to the
extent that the loss is attributable to the plaintiff's fault, it need not be
redistributed. It is fair to require the plaintiff to bear that portion of the
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loss, and requiring him to do so provides an incentive for him to be
careful. The most appropriate way to achieve the proper balance is to
reduce the plaintiff's recovery in proportion to the extent of his own
fault; that is, the more he is at fault, less of the loss will be redistributed.
This approach also would maximize the deterrent effect of strict liability.
The sanction imposed on the plaintiff increases with his culpability. That
portion not borne by the plaintiff is shifted to the defendant. This loss,
or potential loss, provides an incentive for the manufacturer to improve
the safety of his products.
If causal contribution were relevant, then it would be reasonable to
consider the plaintiff's non-negligent contribution in apportioning the
harm. That is, if there is social fault in marketing the product, why is
there not also social fault in buying or using the product; no harm can
result from defective products unless they are used. Thus, even in cases
in which neither the plaintiff nor the defendant is negligent, damages
might be apportioned according to the causal contribution of each to the
result. No one would consider doing this because, to the extent that the
loss is not shifted to the defendant, risk spreading and deterrence are
defeated with no offsetting benefit. Improved risk distribution can be
achieved only if the amount of loss the plaintiff is required to bear is
rationally related to the extent of his fault. Any test of causal contribu-
tion (physical force, directness/indirectness, etc.) provides an essentially
arbitrary basis for apportionment because it has no relationship to cul-
pability.
D. Application of Comparative Negligence Statutes
Many of the problems arising in this area have resulted from the
attempt to apply comparative negligence statutes to strict liability cases.
Most such statutes are expressly limited to tort actions based on negli-
gence and require a comparison of the negligence of the plaintiff and
defendant. Such statutes cannot be applied in workable fashion to strict
liability cases.
Hagenbuch v. Snap-On Tools Corp.10 1 clearly illustrates the problem.
The plaintiff's eye was injured when a hammer he was using chipped
due to decarbonization. He was contributorily negligent in using the
hammer because he knew that it had chipped before. He sued the de-
fendant who had marketed the hammer under his own brand name and
the actual manufacturer of the hammer on theories of strict liability and
negligence. In a judge-tried case, the federal district court found that
the manufacturer of the hammer was not negligent, but that the defen-
dant who marketed the hammer was negligent in not exercising his
superior knowledge to require the manufacturer to use procedures that
would reduce the hazard of decarbonization. The court also found that
101. 339 F. Supp. 676 (D.N.H. 1972).
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both defendants were subject to strict liability because the hammer was
defective. The court predicted that New Hampshire would apply its
comparative negligence statute to strict liability actions. It found that the
causal negligence attributable to the plaintiff was 20 percent and entered
a judgment against both defendants for 80 percent of the damages on
the strict liability theory. The judge gave no indication as to how he
arrived at these percentages.
One problem with the decision is that the judge did not indicate
how it Was possible to enter a judgment against the defendant man-
ufacturer who was found to be non-negligent. New Hampshire has a
modified comparative negligence statute which precludes any recovery if
the plaintiff's negligence is greater than the defendant's negligence. 10 2
Because the defendant manufacturer was not negligent at all, the plain-
tiff's negligence, no matter how slight, must have been greater. Thus, if
the statute applied, no recovery could be had against that defendant
under either a strict liability theory or a negligence theory.'
A second problem is whether the New Hampshire comparative neg-
ligence statute even can be applied to a strict liability action. It was ar-
gued that the statute did not apply to strict liability because it did not
specifically refer to that type of action. The court countered this argu-
ment by saying that the statute could not have referred to strict liability
because section 402A was judicially adopted after the enactment of the
comparative negligence statute. This reasoning is questionable because
strict liability (based on a breach of warranty theory) was imposed in
New Hampshire before adoption of its comparative negligence statute.
Therefore, a stronger argument might be that the comparative negli-
gence statute was not intended to apply to strict liability.
If a modified comparative negligence statute is literally applied to
strict liability cases, highly undesirable results will occur. In cases in
which there is no evidence of the defendant's negligence, or in which the
defendant is less negligent than the plaintiff, simple contributory negli-
gence emerges as a complete bar to recovery.
The only way to reach a desirable result is to reinterpret the statute
to say something that it does not say. Thus, as one court which applied
its comparative negligence statute to strict liability has said: 104 "The
comparative negligence statute becomes more than a comparative negli-
gence or even comparative fault statute; it becomes a comparative cause
statute under which all independent and concurrent causes of an acci-
dent may be apportioned on a percentage basis." This "creative legal
fiction"'10 5 is advocated as being necessary to achieve improved loss allo-
102. Orcutt & Ross, Comparative Negligence in New Hampshire, 12 N.H.B.J. 6
(1969).
103. Id. at 9.
104. Busch v. Busch Constr., Inc., 262 N.W.2d 377, 394 (Minn. 1977), quoting
Jensvold, supra note 87, at 725.
105. Jensvold, supra note 87, at 749.
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cation. Such reinterpretation of unmistakably clear legislative language is
simply unacceptable if the rule of law is to prevail in our system. Courts
are simply not free to ignore clear statutory language of this nature.
It is not necessary to apply comparative negligence statutes to strict
liability cases in order to reduce the plaintiff's recovery in proportion to
his fault. Where such statutes are concerned only with negligence liabil-
ity, they have no effect one way or the other on strict liability actions.
Common law courts have as much power to determine what shall con-
stitute a defense to common law strict liability as they did prior to the
passage of the comparative negligence statutes.106 Thus, courts are free
to reject the rule that simple contributory negligence is no defense and
adopt the rule that it is a partial defense notwithstanding the existence
of a comparative negligence statute.'0 7
IV. DAMAGE APPORTIONMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH
THE QUANTUM OF THE PLAINTIFF's FAULT
The most satisfactory method to apportion damages in true strict
liability cases is to reduce the plaintiff's recovery in proportion to the
extent of his own fault. This will achieve the most equitable risk dis-
tribution in view of the policy underlying strict liability. Losses will be
redistributed except to the extent that the plaintiff was at fault; the
greater the fault, the less loss that will be redistributed. This is consistent
with the policy of deterrence because such apportionment will encourage
plaintiffs to act reasonably. That portion of the loss which is shifted to
the manufacturer provides an incentive for him to make his products
more safe. The approach is also consistent with the policy of risk
spreading. To the extent that the plaintiff is innocent, all risks are
spread among all consumers. Losses will lie with a given plaintiff only to
the extent that he has been at fault, and there is no compelling reason to
shift this portion of the loss to society as a whole.
The method of apportioning damages in accordance with the plain-
tiff's fault is to compare the plaintiff's conduct with how he should have
conducted himself (the objective standard of the reasonable man) and
reduce his recovery according to the extent of his fault.1 0 8 The determi-
nation made by the jury is the same as under comparative negligence,
except that the comparison is made between one unreasonable person
(the plaintiff) and one hypothetical reasonable person, rather than be-
tween two unreasonable people (the plaintiff and the defendant). A
plaintiff who is guilty of mere inadvertence is only moderately at fault
and should have his damages reduced to a moderate extent. A plaintiff
who knowingly encounters a serious risk for no good reason is greatly at
fault and should have his damages reduced to a very great extent. Pre-
106. Schwartz, supra note 11, at 180.
107. General Motors Corp. v. Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. 1977).
108. Payne, supra note 20, at 347.
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cise mathematical determination of the percentage of reduction appro-
priate in each case is of course impossible,109 but this is also impossible
under comparative negligence. A rough apportionment can be made,
and the result is clearly superior to the alternative of either barring the
plaintiff completely or permitting him to recover his full damages.
V. CONCLUSION
Whether comparative negligence should be applied in strict liability
actions is a question of policy. The advantage this approach offers is that
it simultaneously advances the risk spreading and safety incentive
policies of strict liability and the deterrence policy of comparative negli-
gence. The disadvantage is that the policies underlying strict liability are
not as fully advanced when comparative negligence is applied as they
otherwise would be. Each jurisdiction must decide which scheme is most
appropriate.
Once the decision to apply comparative negligence to strict liability
has been made, it is imperative that the scheme of comparative negli-
gence employed be adapted to the special problems of strict liability.
Otherwise the objectives underlying the decision may be partially or
wholly thwarted. Application of existing comparative negligence statutes
to strict liability cases can result in the reintroduction of simple con-
tributory negligence as a complete defense in many instances, even when
the negligence of the plaintiff is very slight. This occurs when the de-
fendant has not been negligent at all or when the defendant's negligence
is less than the plaintiff's negligence in a modified comparative negli-
gence jurisdiction. Adoption of comparative causation is equally unsatis-
factory because of the impossibility of measuring the causal contribution
of each party and because, in any event, causal contribution is irrelevant
to determining the degree of each party's culpability. Adoption of the
"fictitious fault" approach is perhaps the most unsatisfactory scheme of
all. In practice this results in submission of the case to the jury with no
meaningful guidance whatsoever. Consequently, cases are decided at the
whim of individual juries. The policies underlying the adoption of com-
parative negligence are not likely to be advanced in a consistent fashion.
The most satisfactory way to implement the decision to apply com-
parative negligence to strict liability cases is to instruct the jury to reduce
the plaintiff's recovery in accordance with the extent of the plaintiff's
fault when his conduct is compared to the conduct of the hypothetical
reasonable person. The court thus fulfills its function of giving meaning-
ful guidance to the jury. Important policy decisions are made as a matter
of law. The jury simply performs its traditional role of determining fact
questions. Rational and consistent disposition of all cases would result
from the implementation of this proposal.
109. Aiken, supra note 17, at 295.
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